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tainty. Reduced uncertainty was found to be the  would suggest. The secondary effects on private
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macroeconomic response (largely because of its  ment policy is likely to be more important than
favorable effect on exchange rate crises).  the direct amount of debt reduction itself.
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itself did not.  package would not have succeeded if the govern-
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Non-Technical  Summary
On March 10 1989, the US Secretary of the Treasury Brady announced US
support for external debt reduction (the "Brady plan").  The rationale for
supporting what amounts to breach of contract was that debt reduction was
considered easential for a restoration of growth and economic stability in the
most indebted countries.  The Mexican debt package, concluded in 1989 and
implemented March 1990, was a spectacular success from that perspective.
Interest rates on local currency debt fell by 20 percentage points within days
of the agreement, private investment has boomed ever since and economic growth
took off for the first time since the debt crisis started in 1982.
The main channel suggested by theory for an impact of debt relief on
future growth is a reduced tax burden (the "debt overhtng" hypothesis).  But
even on the most generous of assumptions, this seems implausible.  In net
present value terms Mexico received about $12 billion debt relief.  This would
on a permanent basis allow at most a 1.5 percentage point cut in the corporate
tax rate.!  Econometric evidence suggests that this falls far short of
explaining the observed private investment boom of on average 14% real growth
for the two years fcllowing the Brady deal's implementation.
Much has been made of the impact of the deal on "investor confidence".
In this context it is important to notice that the transfer Mexico has to make
was not only reduced, but also smoothed out.  Thus the specter of recurring
crises associated with particular peaks in repayment obligations lost much of
its threat as the new debt service obligation schedule was not only less
1/  Mexico receives about 3.5% of GDP at a 35% corporate tax rate. Due to a
comprehensive definition of the tax base and the absence of almost all special
creditse.  average and marginal rates are close. Assuming a conservative 3
percent growth-adjusted real interest rate (real interest rate minus real
growth rate) yields the claim stated in the text.onerous in discounted value terms, but also had a much lower variance.  In
this paper, we assess the impact of the Brady deal through the channel of
increased smoothness of debt service, and explicitly contrast it with the debt
overhang hypothesis.  We fJnd that reduced variance explains most of the
effect of the deal, and that a proxy for the debt overhang effect has no
explanatory power at all.
These results confirm the potentially beneficial macroeconomic effects
of debt relief, but reject the debt overhang hypothesis as an explanatory
factor for them.  Econometric evidence presented in this paper indicates that
the impact of debt relief on uncertainty is the most important channel through
which debt relief influences the macroecoromy.  We furthermore sharpen the
results by identifying specifically the favorable impact on uncertainty about
future exchange rate crises as the dominant mechanism in explaining the growth
and investment response to debt relief.
The most important conclusion that follows from our results is that the
likely impact of debt service relief can be much larger than the magnitude of
the relief coupled with standard growth models would suggest.  The secondary
effects on private investment through reduced future policy uncertainty are
likely to be more important than the direct amount of the relief itself.
Another important result follows also, almost as a corollary; these
secondary effects through reduced uncertainty will obviously not come into
play unless other, potentially dominant sources of future policy uncertsinty
have been removed first.  Thus the successful domeatic reform program that the
Mexican government put through in the years Preceding the debt package was a
necessary precondition for the debt package to be successful.  In that sense
the debt package was so successful because the Mexicans had been so successful
in reforming their economy first; without that the package would not have had
such a spectacular effect.1
1.  INTRODUCTION
On March 10 1989, the US Secratary of the Treasury Brady announced
official support for external debt reduction (the "Brady plan").  The
rationale for supporting what amounts to breach of contract was that debt
reduction was considered essential for a restoration of growth and economic
stability in the most indebted countries.  The Mexican debt package, concluded
in July 1989 and implemented March 1990, was a spectacular success from that
perspective.  Interest rates on local currency debt fell by 20 percentage
points within days of the agreement, private investment has boomed ever since
and economic growth took off for the first time since the debt crisis started
in 1982.
Such success was not widely anticipated (cf.  Dornbusch and Modigliani
(1989) for a skeptical assessment); there was a widely shared view that the
amounts were simply not enough to make much of an impact.  Mexico received
about $4 billion cash flow relief per year, 2 of which would likely have come
anyhow as amortization could have been expected to be rolled over.  In a $200
billion economy, 2 or even 4 billion seems a small tail to wag a large dog. 3
The optimistic prediction in van Wijnbergen (1989)  was based on the assumption
that real interest rates would drop by 20 percentage points; this assumption
turned out to be correct, but as it was not itself endogenously linked to the
debt deal, we are still left with a question mark about the exact mechanisms
through which debt relief affects private sector investment and output growth.
Oks  (1991) also finds a significant impact of the Brady deal on Mexican
2/ De Long and Eichengreen discuss exactly the same issues in the context of
the Marshall plan of 1948.2
interest rates: a dummy for the debt deal shows up significantly in a risk
premium equation.  However, the use of a dummy once again leaves the exact
mechanism  unspecified.
The main channel suggested by theory for the impact of debt relief on
investment, ani from there on future growth, is the removal of debt overhang
through a reduced tax burden (Helpman (1989),  Krugman (1989),  Sachs (1990)).
But even on the most generous of assumptions, this seems implausible.  In net
present value terms Mexico received about $12 billion debt relief (van
Wijnbergen (19911).  This would on a permanent basis allow at most a 1.5
percentage point cut in the corporate tax rate.y  Econometric evidence
suggests that this falls far short of explaining the observed private
investment boom of on average 14% real growth for the two yea-  s following the
implementation of the Brady deal.y
Much has been made of the impact of the deal on "investor confidence"
(Gurria and Fadl (1991),  van Wijnbergen (1991)).  In this context it is
important to notice that the external transfer Mexico has to make was not only
reduced by the deal, but also smoothed out.  Thus the specter of recurring
crises associated with particular peaks in repayment obligations lost much of
its threat as the new debt service obligation schedule was not only less
onerous in discounted value terms, but also had a much lower variance.  The
lengthening of debt maturity brought about by the 1989-90 debt restructuring
3/ The Government receives about 3.5% of GDP at a 35% corporate tax rate. Due
to a comprehensive definition of the tax base and the absence of almost all
special credits, average and marginal rates are close. Assuming a conservative
3 percent growth-adjusted real interest rate (real interest rate minus real
growth rate) yields the claim stated in the text.
4/ van Wijnbergen (1989)  presents econometric evidence on the sensitivity of
private investment with respect ,  the after tax rate of interest.3
was the key factor behind the sharp reduction in the variance of the net
tr,.nafer  to foreign creditors.  The projected variance of the transfer was
further reduced by the issue of fixed-interest rate debt instruments (par
bonds).
The importance of smoothness of public debt service obligations for
financial stability has been stressed in the lir.erature  on domestic debt and
financial crises (Giavazzi  and Pagano (1989)),  but has not received attention
in the literature on foreign debt.  In this paper, we assess the impact of the
Brady deal through the channel of increased smoothness of debt service, and
explicitly contrast it with the debt overhang hypotnesis.  We find that the
reduction in the variance explains most of the effect of the deal.  A proxy
for the debt overhang effect has no explanatory power at all for the
investment recovery, and the results indicate that the debt overhang effect
played only a minor role in the reduction in interest rates.
Another important result follows also, almoet as a  corollary; the
effects through reduced uncertainty will obviously not come into play unless
other, potentially dominant sources of future policy uncertainty have been
removed first.  Thus tha successful domestic reform program that the Mexican
government put through in the years Preceding the debt package was a necessary
precondition for the debt package to be successful, while the reforms alone
were not sufficient to allow for a recovery of investment.  In that sense the
debt package was so successful because the Mexicans had been so successful in
reforming their economy first; without that the package would not have had
such a spectazular effect.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, we
provide a brief overview of macroeconomic developments in Mexico before and4
after the package, and a short description of the deal itself.  Section 3 then
presents a model formalizing the conjecture that the variance of debt service
has an important impact on the macroeconomy.  Section 4 describes the data
used and the regression results.  Section 5 concludes.
2.  BACKGROUND: DEBT CRISIS, ADJUSTMENT AND THE DEBT REDUCTION AGREEMENT
2.1  Debt Crisis and Adjustment.
Between 1950 and 1974, Mexico enjoyed high growth, low inflation and
moderate external debt accumulation.  This era of fiscal conservatism came to
an abrupt end in the early seventies. The period of single digit inflation
ended in 1973, the real excha:,e rate started to appreciate and the
accumulation of external debt accelerated above the GNP growth rate.
A  financial and economic crisis in 1976 ended following majo. oil
a-acoveries in 1977.  The ensuing prosperity lasted until 1982, when soaring
domestic inflation, falling international oil prices, rising world interest
rates and massive capital flight ($21  billion in 1981-82 according to recent
estimates; cf. Brideau, Eggerstedt and van Wijnbergen (1992)) led to a refusal
by external creditors to roll over the principal payments falling due in that
year of about $8 billion of Mexico's external public debt and subsequent
reachedulings of Mexican external debt principal repayments.
A sharp real depreciation of the Peso and unprecedented fiscal
tightening wera necessary to effect a net transfer to foreign creditors of
about 5% of GDP in the years following 1982.  Economic growth was zero on
average over the period 1982-1988.  In late 1987 the Governmont announced the5
"Economic Solidarity P&ct" (Pacto),  which called for accelerated structural
reform, further tightening of fiscal and monetary policy, a freeze of minimum
wagss and basic public and private sector prices, and a freeze of the nominal
exchange eate against the U.S. dollar.  The Pacto brought inflation down irom
a three digit level in 1987 to 20% in 1989-1992.
Since more than 90% of Mexico's US$100.8 billion foreign debt
outstanding at the end of 1988 was public or publicly-guaranteed, pressures on
the Government for reaching an agreement with foreign creditors were building
up.  High and volatile external transfers generated uncertainty about whether
the future transfer burden could be met.  This generated increased uncertainty
about future exchange rate developments which, in turn, was translated into
high interest rates on domestic debt.  "Ex post" real interest rates were
almcst 50% in the months before the debt accord was reached.  With domestic
public debt at approximately 20% of GDP in 1989, interest rates this high
severely threatened the fiscal underpinnings of the stabilization program and
led to a reduced level of private investment.
2.2  The Debt and Debt Service Reduction (DDSR1  Agreement.
Against this background, debt negotiations started in February 1989,
after earlier agreements with Mexico's bilateral (Paris club) and multilateral
creditors had been reached. Mexico was the first country to negotiate and
obtain a debt and debt service reduction (DDSR)  agreement under the Brady
Initiative.  An agreement in principle was reached on July 23, 1989, and the
final package was implemented on March 28, 1990 under which $48,231 million of
commercial bank debt was restructured.  Of this 47% was committed to a par6
bond  at unchanged  principal  but  at a reduced,  fixed  interest  rate  c4 6.25%;
43%  was committed  to a discount  bond  at unchanged  interest  rates  but  with
principal  reduced  by 35%1  and 11%  to the  new  money  option,  which  left  both
principal  and  interest  rate  unaffected  but called  for  25 cents  new  money  per
dollar  committed. The  package  as a  whole  delivered  aiout  $12  billion  debt
reduction  in discounted  value  terms  (van  Wijnbergen  (lV91)).
2.3  Macroeconomic  impact  of  the  Debt  Agreement.
When the  deal  was  announced,  nominal  interest  rates  on local  currency
denoml.nated  debt  dropped  20  percentage  points  within  day".  This implied
annual  savings  on domestic  public  debt  service  of about  4 percent  of GDP,
several  times  the  direct  impact  of the  deal  on foreign  debt  service. Pt the
same  tim.,  private  investment  rebounded  after  years  of slow  progress  if  any;
real  private  investment,  which  had  stagnated  during  1982-1988  (on  average  1
percent  growth),  grew  by 11.2  percent  over 1989-1991. 1989  also  saw  a
recovery  of economic  growth;  over  1989-1991,  real  growth  averaged  almost  4
percent. The  most spectacular  reversal  took  place  in the  capital  account  of
the  balance  of payments;  on  various  estimates,  around  $10  billion  flight
capital  returned  in late  1989  and  1990 (Gurria  and  Fadl (1991),  Brideau,
Eggerstedt  and  van  Wijnbergen  (1992)). And  total  private  capital  inflows
averaged  $21  billion  annually  in  1991-92.
Interest  rates  on dollar  denominated  debt fell  too,  but  by much less
than rates  on Peso  denominated  debt ("CETES").  On short  term dollar  linked
instruments  ("PAGAFE"),  rates  fell  from  around  20%  t- 16%  on an annual  basis,
or about  a fifth  of the  drop in  Peso  rates  (see  Figure  2 on  page 11).  The7
bigger drop in Peso denominated debt strongly suggests the ,.mportance  of
expectations about impending 'lance  of payments crises and their impact on
exchange rate oustainability rather than considerations of public solvency.
3.  THE MODEL
The model presented below is a simplified implementation of the ideas
outlined in Giavazzi and Pagano (1989).V'  Take the following situation.
The private E actor  has access to foreign and domestic lending and investment
opportunities, and is risk neutral.  Lack of creditworthiness prevents the
government (Central  Bank and Treasury combined) to borrow abroad.  The
government faces variable external debt service payments of B.  in period t, t=
1,...T, and rolls over every period the total principal on its internal debt
of D at &  nominal interest rate, it.
The government can finance the debt service payments Bt  and it*D  in
three ways: from its primary surplus (PS), through domestic borrowings, and by
a (temporary) increase in the domestic monetary base (monetization).  While
Mexico has made large fiscal adjustments over the 1980s, in the short-run the
primary surplus can not easily be adjusted.  This leaves Mexico with the
choice between domestic debt financirg and monetization.  We use a to denote
the fraction of the foreign and domestic debt service remaining (after taking
account of the primary surplus) that the government decides to monetize.
Clearly a is a reflection of the type of monetary policy the government is
5/The setup here is somewhat different from Giavazzi and Pagano (1989)  where
the domestic debt service falling due is variable.  Here, the main source of
variability is the foreign debt service falling due.  The results are
identical since what matters is that the total debt service falling due net of
the primary surplus is variable.8
pursuing.  Ex-ante, the private sector is, however, not perfectly informed
about the conduct of monetary policy and regards a  as a random variable,
distributed uniformly, T1(O,a,.).
The variability of debt service payments and uncertainty about the
conduct of monetary policy can lead to two (or  more) equilibria: in one
equilibrium the private sector has confidence that there will be no crisis
(N); and in the other(s) the private sector is convinced that a crisis is
possible (C).  The crisis is assumed to take the form of devaluation of the
currei-y.  More specifically, in the crisis equilibrium, the private sector
believes, because the government may monetizes the share a of debt service due
in excesp eof  its primary surplus, that there will be a devaluation of x
percent (assumed  to be exogenously determined) with probability a.  As the
domestic currency is fully backed by reserves,@ a devaluation is more likely
to happen when the government monetizes in order to service its debts.  The
larger the amount monetized, the higher the chance that the currency will
devalue as reserves decline to too low a level (here  the lower bound is
assumed to be zero) and a speculative attack on the currency occurs.  Which of
the equilibria (C  or N) will prevail will depend on whether the private sector
(in rational manner) assigns ex-ante a positive or a zero probability to a
devaluation.  Both can, under certain circumstances, be rational expectations
outcome.
Assume that money demand is of the constant elasticity type: M =  A*e-dt,
where it  is the domestic interest rate.  Consider now what happens to money
demand in both equilibria: in N, it  will be equal to the foreign rate r-,  and
M  =  A*e-', which will equal the money supply, which equals the reserve level
6/We equate the two as we abstract from the domestic financial system.9
R; in C, it  will be the f' eign interest rate plus the expected depreciation,
and Mc  =  A*e-09"+u).  Moving from equilibrium N to C implies thus a sudden drop
in  money  demand  of A*e-r**(l-e-mm)  =  R*(1-e-0u)  and a loss in reserves.  In the
crisis  equilibrium,  the  government  will  also  face  a  higher  interest  rate,  r  +
fx, on  its  domestic  borrowings,  D,  further  increasing  the  chances of an actual
devaluation (if  the  government  monetizes the share a  of  debt  service  due  in
excess of its primary surplus).
The fall in money demand and the (temporary) increase in the monetary
base will create an actual foreign exchange crisis--the government has to
devalue--when R*(1-e-m)  + a(B,  + (r*+irx)*D  - PS) > R, or, rearranging, when a
> aA(,r),  where aA(wr)  =  R*e0"X/(Bt  + (r*+,r)*D  - PS).  The probability of a
devaluation is now defined by the implicit function Xr  =  Prob(a>aA(,r)),  where
Prob(a>a-(ff))  is equal to  1 - aA(w)/ac  . Figure 1 plots the probability
function P(a>aA(ir))  as a function of , for different levels of B,. (We  use the
following parameters: D =  80, o  - 0.05, R =  12, x  0.5, r =  0.1, PS =  30, a
=  1].
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it is, as for B 2 =  30.2' As a result, the probability of a devaluation for
two different debt service obligations wi.ll  always be higher than (or  equal
to) the probability of a devaluation for the mean of the two debt service
obligations.  In the example, the probability of a devaluation is zero for the
mean of the two debt service obligations, B3 =  25, as the line P(a>a^(ir))  does
not cross the 450-line, while the mean probability of a devaluation for B,  =
20 and B2 = 30 is strictly larger than zero (about 0.32).  This implies that
domestic interest rates, which will reflect devaluations expectations, will be
higher when the variability of debt service payments falling due is large.
Any reduction in the variability in expected debt service payments falling due
would then lower interest rates.  And, because with irreversibility investment
will depend negatively on the level of uncertainty (e.g.,  see Pindyck, 1991),
it also implies that investment will increase  when the variability in debt
service falling due is reduced.
4.  EMPIRICAL APPLICATION.
4.1  Data
We look at three Mexican assets to assess the impact of debt service
variability on asset prices.  The most obvious example is physical capital;
because of its irreversibility, the impact of variability-induced rate of
return uncertainty is clear.  So the first part of the econometric analysis
looks at private capital accumulation.  An index of private fixed investment
is available with monthly frequency.
7/For high levels of B (as in the case of B2  =  20)), there will actually be
two possible outcomes for w, a low a  and a high v.  There is nothing in the
model that can determine which equilibrium will prevail.11
The  second  asset  we  Figure 2
consider  is  CETES,  which  is  the  Interest  Rates  on Peso- and Dollar-
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assets  fears  of  being  locked  in  {-C  4ts ()  -+-PqOW-(dc4)  -Po*sebd*valiw
while  a  crisis  unfolds  are  in
fact not unfounded.  The first point is that even 28 days may be too long to
get out when a balance of payments crisis with associated exchange rate
response threatens.  Second, investors may end up getting locked in if capital
controls are imposed during or even in the run up to a crisis.  Mexico did
impose capital controls once before in a period of crisis (August 1982).
Mexico offers a unique opportunity to decompose the interest
differential between CETES and equal maturity debt instruments in the US.  For
this we look at a third asset.  The Mexican Government issues a debt
instrument similar to CETES, but denominated in dollars (PAGAFE).  We can thus
split the differential between CETES and the US 1-month T-bill rate in a pure
exchange risk component and a pure country risk premium.  The first is
captured by the CETES-PAGAFE differential (corrected for the preannouncedw
rate of devaluation), and the second by the differential between PAGAFE and
8/In the empirical application we use the actual rate of devaluation (see  the
Data Appendix).12
the US T-bill rate.  We analyze the response of both interest differentials to
measures of the projected net transfer and projected variance of the net
transfer to foreign creditors.
Our measure of the projected transfer to foreign creditors is a moving
average discounted net transfer (interest  plus amortization less
disbursements) over the 48 months following the observation.  An 8% annual
discount factor (or  a 0.64% monthly discount factor) is assumed (this  was
about the LIBOR rate at the time).
We first define the discounted net transfer of month t+i measured at
month t (DSt)  as:
(5)  DSt- =  (r,,*Ft.  +  At4  - Dt-)/(1.0064)i
where:  rt*Ft+  is the interest on the stock of debt at month t+i
At4,  DtZ are projected amortizations and disbursements at month
t+i; 1/1.0064 is the constant monthly discount factor
The average projected net transfer over the following 48 months measured
at month t (NT,)  is then:
(6)  NTt  =  E (DStj)/49  i =  0...48
The measure of the variance of the net foreign transfer at time t is:
(7)  SNTt  =  E  ((DSti  - NTt) 2/(1.0064)']  i =  0  ...  4813
The NT and SNT measures were  Figure 3
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4.2  Regressions  zzmizz
The model predicts that a
reduction in variability lowers the domestic interest rates and raises
investment.  As the literature has focussed on the effect of the level of net
transfers (the tax in the debt overhang literature), we also investigate
whether the interest rate and investment are affected by the average level of
net transfers.  We first consider the impact on physical capital accumulation
and then on interest rates.  We then separate out currency risk from more
general country risk by analyzing the response of both local currency and
dollar denominated Mexican debt instruments.
4.2.1 Debt Relief and Priv;te Investment
Equation (8) links private investment 2 ' to the measures of average net
transfer and variance of future net transfers using Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS).  Consider first the debt overhang hypothesis, with NT, the measure of
9/ The monthly index of private fixed investment published in "Indicadores
Economicos" of the Bank of Mexico.14
average  projected  net  external  transfers,  as a proxy  for  future  tax  burden
(associated  with the foreign  debt  service):
(8)  log(Ip)  =  0.856  - 0.006*log(NT)  +  0.808*1cg(Ip l)
(1.32)  (-0.32)  (6.34)
Al  = 0.59  H-Statistic  =  -1.16  F  =  21.6  Sample:  1988.04-1990.12
The  value  for  the  H-statistic  (the  more conventional  Durbin  Watson  test
cannot  be used  because  of the  presence  of lagged  endogenous  variables  on the
right  hand  side  of the  equation)  indicates  the  absence  of serial  correlation.
While  the net  transfer  variable  has  the  right  sign,  it is  entirely
insignificant,  with a dismal  t-statistic  of only  0.32.  Inserting  the  variance
measure  significantly  improves  regression  performance:
(9)  log(Ip) =  2.276 +  0.020*log(NT) - 0.146*log(SNT) +  0.476*log(Ip. 1)
(3.30) (0.56)  (-3.03)  (2.99)
=  0.69  H-Statistic  =  -1.409  F =  32.62  Sample:  1988.04-1990.12
The  coefficient  of the  lagged  endogenous  variable  goes down,  and  the  variance
of net  transfers  enters  with  the  right  sign  and is  highly  significant.  The
debt  overhang  proxy  remains  insignificant  and  now  even  gets  the "wrong"  sign.
The  H-statistic  again  indicates  absence  of serial  correlation. Not
surprisingly,  regression  performance  does  not  change  much  when  the  NT variable
is left  out:15
(10)  log(Ip)  =  2.294  - 0.140*log(SNT)  + 0.51*log(Ip- 1)
(3.37) (-3.02)  (3.00)
R2  =  0.69  H-Statistic  =  -1.256  F =  32.6  Sample:  1988.04-1990.12
The results  suggest  that  NT,  the  proxy  for  debt  overhang,  is  not
significant,  and  that  the  variance  of the  transfer  variable  is.  An intriguing
question  is  whether  the  variance  variable  captures  the  entire  impact  of the
Brady  plan  or  whether  there  are  other  factors  at play  that  we have  failed  to
account  for.  We test  this  in an admittedly  crude  way  by rerunning  equation
(10),  but now  %.>th  an additional  "Brady  Deal"  dummy  included 1 ol:
(11)  log(Ip) =  2.271 - 0.149*log(SNT) - O.OO9*BRADY  + 0.477*Iog(Ip(-1))
(3.26) (2.64)  (0.30)  (2.97)
=  0.69  H-Statistic  =  -1.491  F =  21.1  Sample:  1988.04-1990.12
The Brady  dummy  enters  with the  wrong  sign  and  insignificantly.  Thus  equation
(11)  strengthens  our results:  it suggests  that  the  variance  measure  captures
the  entire  impact  of the  Brady  deal.
These  regressions  show  that  the  variance  index  (SNT)  was a statistically
significant  explanatory  factor  of  private  investment  (Ip)  whereas  the average
projected  net  transfer  (NT)  was  not.  The  debt overhang  explanation  of  the
macroeconomic  impact  of debt  relief  thus finds  no support  in  the  data;  the
10/  BRADY  =  1 from  1989.07  onwards  and zero  before  that  date.16
empirical analysis suggestd that the impact of debt relief on uncertainty is a
more important channel through which debt relief influences the macroeconomy.
4.2.2 Interest Rates and Debt Relief I: Exchange Rate Risk. CETES and PAGAFE
Consider next a similar analysis, but now for CETES. This asset allows
us to focus the analysis directly on exchange rate expectations by first
looking at the rate differential between CETES and PAGAFE.  As already
indicated, the difference in currency denomination is the only difference
between the two debt instruments.  Figure 2 showed the interest rate on CETES
and on PAGAFE, with the latter corrected for the preannounced rate of
devaluation.
Regressing the interest rate differential corrected for preannounced
devaluation, INTDIFFlU',  on the same set of measures as were used in the
investment equation gives similar results!V:
(12)  INTDIFF1  =  -0.162  +  0.076*NT  +  0.429*SNT
(-1.01)  (0.81)  (2.56)
R=  0.77  DW =  1.67  Sample: 1988.3 - 1990.12
INTDIFI  =  (1+1)-
11/  INTDIFF1  =  (lvi(  )  (1  y)  ,  with i for  CETES,  iv  for  PAGAFE,  and  I  the
preannounced rate of devaluation.
12/ All interest rate equations were estimateQ using the Maximum Likelihood
procedure in SAS assuming first order serial correlation, as the DW statistic
in OLS regressions always indicated presence of serial correlation.  The DW
statistics reported in this section refer to the equation estimated under the
assumption of first order serial correlation.17
This regression also indicates that the variance of net transfers, rather than
the projected net transfer itself, is the main factor behind the dramatic
interest rate response to Mexico's debt package.  The variance of the net
transfer is statistically significant, and the net transfer itself  is not.
Not surprisingly, almost no explanatory power is lost when the net transfer is
left out:
(13)  INTDIFF1  =  -0.139 +  0.489*SNT
(-0.89)  (3.20)
R2 =  0.76  DW =  1.67  Sample: 1988.3 - 1990.12
Adding the Brady dummy to equation (13) does not change anything
significantly:
(14)  INTDIFF1  =  0.001 +  0.356*SNT - 0.084*BRADY
(0.04)  (1.89)  (-1.12)
R2 =  0.77  DW =  1.70  Sample: 1988.3 - 1990.12
Again the variance term captures all the effects of the Brady plan; the Brady
dummy, a proxy for any effects of the deal not taken into account, is
insignificant.18
4.2.3 Interest Rates and Debt Relief II: Country Risk. PAGAFE and the US
Treasury bill rate
Consider finally the differential between PAGAFE and the one month US T-
bill, INTDIFF2.  Because both are denominated in US dollars, the difference
between them is a pure measure of country risk.  Regressing INTDIFF22I on
the variance and expected value of the net transfer yields the following:
(15)  INTDIFF2 =  -0.005 +  0.115*NT +  0.07*SNT
(0.02)  (1.99)  (0.76)
A 2 =  0.80  DW =  1.24  Sample: 1988.3 - 1990.12
Now the variance of the transfer is completely insignificant, and the transfer
itself is only borderline significant.  The DW statistic is in the middle of
the inconclusive range (1.11-1.36)  for the relevant number of degrees of
freedom; however regressing the error term on its own lag yields a t-statistic
on the latter's coefficient of only 1.35, so we did not apply any further
error corrections.
Rerunning the equation omitting the insignificant variance term yields
similar results, except that the significance of the net transfer term
increases:
13/  INTDIFF2  +  (1  iPAG) (1  iv19
(16)  INTDIFF2 =  0.044 +  0.12*i'T
(0.75) (2.34)
=  0.80  DW =  1.29  Sample: 1988.3 - 1990.12
The DW statistic is now borderline in support of zero residual serial
correlation (the inconclusive range is (1.172-1.291).  Regressing the error
term on its own lag not surprisingly yields a low t-statistic (0.91).  Thus no
further correction seems warranted.
These results are strikingly different from the ones obtained for
investment and the CETES-PAGAFE interest rate differential.  The variance
plays no role, and the transfer itself only marginally, in explaining the
interest rate differential between PAGAFE and the one month US Treasury Bill
rate.  This fits in well with our hypothesis that it is mostly exchange rate
uncertainty that matters; exchange rate uncertainty plays no role in
explaining this interest rate differential since both assets are dollar
denominated, and the transfer effect captures the partial reduction in country
risk.
4.2.4 Summina UD
The empirical results thus confirm the conjecture put forward in the
introduction, that the impact of debt relief on uncertainty is the most
important channel through which debt relief influences the macroeconomy; and
they sharpen our hypothesis by pointing specifically at the favorable impact
on uncertainty about future exchange rate crises as the dominant factor in
explaining the investment and growth response to debt relief.20
The transfer effect is significant in explaining the PAGAFE rate, or
country risk; however, one should be aware that the PAGAFE rate dropped only 4
percentage points after the Brady deal.  Reduction in pure country risk thus
explains only 4 percentage points of the overall drop of 20 percentage points
in the differential between CETES and the T-bill rate observed immediately
after the Brady deal was announced.
5.  CONCLUSIONS
Interest rates fell sharply after Mexico announced the successful
conclusion of the negotiations with commercial banks aoout debt reduction, and
private investment and growth recovered sharply.  Econometric evidence
presented in this paper indicates that the impact of debt relief on
uncertainty is the most important channel through which debt relief triggers
such macroeconomic effects.  The debt relief reduced uncertainty principally
by reducing the variability of repayment obligations which, at the time, could
not be smoothed out by Mexico as it was credit-rationed.  The evidence shows
that while the impact of the variance of the projected net transfer on
investment is statistically significant, the impact of the projected net
transfer itself is not.
Our analysis of the interest rate response furthermore sharpened the
results by identifying the favorable impact on uncertainty about future
exchance rate crises as the dominant mechanism in explaining the macroeconomic
response to debt relief.  These results confirm the potentially beneficial
macroeconomic effects of debt relief, but reject the debt overhang hypothesis
as an important explanatory factor for them.21
There  is an intriguing  analogy  with a  much earlier  episode  of large
external  assistance.  In their  analysis  of  the  Marshall  plan for  Europe's
reconstruction  in 1948,  De Long  and  1ichengreen  (1991)  show  that traditional
channels  cannot  possibly  explain  the  spectacular  success  of that  program.  The
amounts  involved  (incidentally  as a share  of GDP similar  to the  debt relief
Mexico  received)  are  simply  too small  to have  as marked  an impact  on growth  as
actually  took  place. They conjecture  that  mechanisms  rather  similar  to the
one  explored  in  this  paper  need  to be invoked  to explain  the  success  of the
Marshall  plan.
The  most important  conclusion  that follows  from  our  results  is  that  the
likely  impact  of debt service  relief  can  be  much larger  than  the  magnitude  of
the relief  coupled  with  standard  growth  models  would  suggest. The  secondary
effects  on private  investr.ent  through  reduc  d  future  uncertainty  are  likely  to
be more important  than  the  direct  amount  of the relief  itself.22
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Data  Appendix:
Table 1 lists the data employed to calculate the interest differential
between peso-denominated domestic public debt and dollar-denominated domestic
public debt adjusted by the preannounced devaluation (INTDIFF1).  The interest
differential is measured as follows:
(1)  INTDIFF1 =  (1 +  i/100)/[(1 +  iL,,/100)*(1  +  y/100)]  - 1
i equals the nominal effective annual interest on peso-denominated domestic
public debt (Cetes 28 days); ip0 is the nominal effective annial interest on
dollar-denominated domestic public debt (PAGAFE  28 days); and y is the
annualized actual devaluation of the peso against the US dollar (there is a
minor discrepancy with the preannounced devaluation rate).25
Table 1. Interest Differential
i  'PAO  y  INTDIFF1  l
1988:Jan  332.5757  55.06078  36.86948  1.038232
Feb  327.9344  56.8795  0  1.72779
Mar  117.212,  Q  36.43456  0  0.59206
Apr  80.52329  26.82091  0  0.42345
May  57.4644  22.28896  _  0  0.287642
Jun  48.50383  22.27675  0  0.21449
Jul  49.51486  21.48562  0  0.230721
Aua  52.15244  23.92272Q  0  0.227801
Sep  52.1375  34.43564  0  0.131675
Oct  57.52609  42.3Q5816_  0  0.106548
Nov  67.99901  40.51497  0  0.195595
Dec  68.29388  35.65322  16.03831  0.069145
89: Jan  64.85105  35.21051  15.24147  0.057968
Feb  62.01072  29.79448  18.73302  0.051274
Mar  61.47335  22.75371  17.11416  0.123199
Akr  66.11012  23.91036Q  _  15.72798  0.158377
May  70.32168  27.60596  15.54275  0.155198
Jun  76.83275  30.33728  16.45815  0.164995
Jul  41.364  21.073692.  15.67603  0.00V359
Aua  39.18834  17.35334  16.00408  0.022431
Sep  42.79426  16.27664  14.72536  0.070431
Oct  46.41416  17.27109  _  14.56386  0.089794
Nov  50.01538  15.81136  16.49668  0.111914
Dec  49.39731  16.34658  13.69422  0.129408
90: Jan  52.4814  16.3116  13.04359  0.159706
Feb  56.35786  17.05985  17.13828  0.140284
Mar  _  59.605.  18.025  12.73658  0.19952
Aor  52.931  17.73  14.33424  0.136141
Mav  39.243  17.871  11.33425  0.061054
Jun  39.394  ,  16265  10.48151  0.085189
Jul  35,.86  15.266  10.76589  0.064167
Aua  34.40904  14.15056  10.66843  0.063963
Seo  35.4787  13.6589  10.57424  0.077987
l,  Oct  30.45391  14  j4143L_ 5.290494  0.082898
Nov  28.0638,  14.90902  5.858032  0.052807
Dec  29.93647  14.59818  7.440796  0,t553226
In Table 2 we report the estimates of the projected net transfer (NT)
and the variance of the projected net transfer (SNT).  The net transfer
projections (i.e., projections of interest, amortizations and disbursements)
are "pipeline" projections prepared by the World Bank's External Debt
Division.  Projections go as far as December 1994 for our latest observation,
i.e., December 1990.  However, since World Bank projections are only updated
in December of each year, the net transfer data employed in the calculation
for the months running up to December of the first year was actual (rather
than projected) data obtained from the Bank of Mexico.  We also assumed that
the impact of the debt restructuring on net transfers was perfectly
anticipated in July 1989 when the agreement in principle was announced.  All
this results in the following procedures to construct the net transfer
variables used in the estimation: i) for the net transfers projected in 1988
we used the actual monthly net transfers for the months that actually fell in
1988 and World Bank projections (made in 1988.12) for the months after
1988.12;  ii) for the 1989.1-1989.6 (prior  to the DDSR plan announcement)
projections we used actual monthly net transfers for the 1989 months and World
Bank projections (made in 1989.12) for the months after 1989.12; and iii) for
the 1989.7-1990.12 projections we used actual net transfers until 1990.12 and
World Bank projections (made in 1990.12) for the months after 1990.12.27
Table  2. Net  Transfer  (NT)  and Variance  of the  Net
Tranffer (SNT) (march  r  9Y5  =  1)
NT  I  SNT  1
1988:Mar  I_1_  7  1
Aor  1,043615  0.9136578
May  1.043069  0.9354615
Jun  1.071462  0.9649376
Jul  1.059288  0.9852648
Aua  1.056994  1.0094836
Sep  1.153636  0.9215588
Oct  1.095474  0.8586899
Nov  1.093671  0.8813044
Dec  1.111386  0.9056212
89: Jan  1.128727  0.9060599
Feb  1.14Q40.49144451
Mar  1.188965  0.9542012
Apr  1.153775  0.9631204
May  1.161921  0.9768235
Jun  2  0.9882428
Jul  0.712316  1.5335344
Aua  0.697654  1.5674955
Seo  0.698062  1.5983988
Oct  0.74706  1.5640814
Nov  0.751103  1.5944446
Dec  0.759426  1.6264214
90: Jan  0.743656..  1.6489762
Feb  0.729128  1.6751762
Mar  0.577246  0.6995677
Apr  0.662674  0.4631334
May  0.690731  0.4484275
Jun  0.715014  0.4572061
Jul  0.739403  0.44121
Aua  0.751093  0.4433348
Set)  0.775085_  0.4275248
Oct  0.811134  0.3995143
Nov  0.810544  0.4087421
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